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A novel no-go theorem is presented which sets a bound upon the extent to which ‘Ψ-epistemic ’
interpretations of quantum theory are able to explain the overlap between non-orthogonal quantum
states in terms of an experimenter’s ignorance of an underlying state of reality. The theorem applies
to any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. In the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more
than half of the overlap between quantum states can be accounted for. Unlike other recent no-go
theorems no additional assumptions, such as forms of locality, invasiveness, or non-contextuality,
are required.
One of the most remarkable features of a quantum sys-
tem is that of non-orthogonality: it is possible to prepare
two different pure quantum states which cannot be per-
fectly discriminated by a single ideal measurement. No
such property exists in classical systems, where two dif-
ferent classical states can always by perfectly discrimi-
nated by a suitably ideal measurement.
Statistical interpretations of the quantum state (see [1–
4] and references therein) present a natural way to under-
stand this feature of non-orthogonality. Suppose that a
‘quantum state’ is only a statistical state, associated with
a probability distribution over some underlying physical
states. Even an ideal quantum preparation procedure
cannot uniquely fix this underlying state of the system
but instead prepares one of a number of possible such
states, with a well defined probability. In such an inter-
pretation, when two quantum states are non-orthogonal,
the associated probability distributions will overlap: the
preparation procedures each have a non-zero probability
of preparing the same physical states, and this is why
they cannot be perfectly distinguished. This has been
called a Ψ-epistemic interpretation[2, 3], as the idea is
that the wavefunction does not itself represent a physi-
cal state, but instead represents an epistemic uncertainty
about the physical state.
A number of recent no-go theorems[5–10] have ex-
plored the consequences of attempting to construct such
Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory. This
paper contributes a new no-go theorem, demonstrating
that any attempt to explain non-orthogonality entirely in
terms of an epistemic overlap is impossible: there are no
‘maximally epistemic’ interpretations of quantum theory.
Using an empirically testable measure, it is shown that
in the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more than half of
the overlap between quantum states could be explained
in terms of an overlap of probability distributions. Un-
like the other recent results, the theorem presented here
makes no additional assumptions beyond the definition
of a Ψ-epistemic theory. This means that this theorem is
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the only such theorem to apply, for example, to the type
of constructive Ψ-epistemic theories presented in [10, 11].
Ontological models and Ψ-epistemic theories.- Two
principal assumptions are involved in analysing whether
a theory is Ψ-epistemic :
1. After a physical procedure prepares a quantum
state, |ψ〉, the system is actually in a physical state
λ. This physical state is not necessarily identified
with the quantum state;
2. The probabilities of getting the results of a mea-
surement procedure on the system are wholly de-
termined by the physical state λ and the measure-
ment procedure. The preparation procedure only
influences the measurement outcomes indirectly,
through the possible physical states prepared.
These assumptions are developed into the ontological
models formalism in[3, 12–15], where the physical state
λ, is referred to as an ontic state.
• A preparation procedure, which prepares the quan-
tum state |ψ〉, will prepare some ontic state λ with
probability µψ(λ):
µψ(λ) ≥ 0,
∫
µψ(λ)dλ = 1 (1)
• A measurement, M , has a number of possible out-
comes {Q}, and a probability ξM (Q|λ) of obtaining
a particular outcome Q, given the ontic state λ:
ξM (Q|λ) ≥ 0,
∑
Q
ξM (Q|λ) = 1 (2)
• An ontological model will reproduce the results of
quantum theory if, and only if:∫
µψ(λ)ξM (Q|λ)dλ = |〈Q |ψ〉|
2
(3)
Additional structure is required to represent unitary op-
erations, but this is not needed for this proof.
Some immediate consequences of this formalism will
be useful. The set Λφ = {λ : µφ(λ) > 0} is the set of
2all possible ontic states which may occur when preparing
the quantum state |φ〉.
If one of the outcomes of the measurement M
is represented by the projection onto |φ〉, then∫
µφ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |φ〉|
2
= 1. It follows that
∀λ ∈ Λφ ξM (φ|λ) = 1 (4)
If |ϕ〉 is orthogonal to |φ〉 then
∫
µϕ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ =
|〈φ |ϕ〉|2 = 0. It follows that
∀λ ∈ Λϕ ξM (φ|λ) = 0 (5)
which implies Λϕ ∩Λφ = ∅. (Sets of measure zero can be
ignored.)
If the quantum two states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are non-
orthogonal, then:∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2 6= 0 (6)
This allows the possibility that Λψ ∩ Λφ is not empty.
A Ψ-epistemic theory is defined[3] to be one in which
there exist at least two distinct non-orthogonal quantum
states, |ψ〉 and |φ〉, for which Λψ ∩ Λφ 6= ∅. In such
a theory, the fact that the quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉
cannot be discriminated by a single ideal measurement
is, at least partially, explained by the fact that there is
some λ ∈ Λψ∩Λφ. As all the results of any measurement
M are determined by ξM (Q|λ), and both |ψ〉 and |φ〉 can
prepare ontic states in Λψ ∩ Λφ, it follows that there is
no possible measurement outcome which can occur with
zero probability for |ψ〉 but with certainty for |φ〉 (and
vice versa).
The term
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ gives a measure of the epistemic
overlap between the quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉. This is
bound by the measure of the quantum state overlap. As
∀λ ∈ Λφ, ξM (φ|λ) = 1∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ =
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ
≤
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2 (7)
The degree of epistemic overlap, Ω [φ, ψ], between two
states can now be defined via:∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ = Ω [φ, ψ] |〈φ |ψ〉|
2
(8)
By definition, Ω [ψ, ψ] = 1. Where 〈φ |ψ〉 = 0, Ω [φ, ψ]
may take any value.
A maximally Ψ-epistemic theory would have
Ω [φ, ψ] = 1 for all pairs of quantum states. The quantum
state overlap |〈φ |ψ〉|2 would be accounted for entirely in
terms of the overlap in the ontic states Λψ ∩ Λφ.
By contrast, a maximally Ψ-ontic theory1 is one in
which Λψ ∩ Λφ = ∅ for all pairs of distinct quantum
1 In much of the existing literature this is simply referred to as a
Ψ-ontic theory.
states, and so Ω [φ, ψ] = 0 . In such a theory, no two dis-
tinct quantum state preparations |ψ〉 and |φ〉 could pos-
sibly produce the same ontic state λ. For a maximally
Ψ-ontic theory, therefore, given the ontic state λ it is al-
ways possible to identify the quantum state |ψ〉. The de
Broglie-Bohm[16, 17], Everett[18] and CSL[19] interpre-
tations of quantum theory are all examples of maximally
Ψ-ontic theories.
It will now be shown that, in Hilbert spaces of dimen-
sion greater than two, there are no models of quantum
theory for which Ω [φ, ψ] = 1 for all states: there are no
maximally Ψ-epistemic interpretations. Making a sym-
metrical assumption that Ω [φ, ψ] is a constant, Ω, be-
tween all pairs of distinct states it will be shown that
Ω ≤ 910 for a 3 dimensional Hilbert space, falling to Ω ≤
1
2
in the limit of large Hilbert spaces. No more than 50%
of the quantum state overlap can be accounted for by an
epistemic overlap of probability distributions.
Three dimensional Hilbert space.- Consider the follow-
ing states of a three dimensional Hilbert space:
|a〉 , |b〉 , |c〉
|p〉 = 1√
3
(|a〉+ |b〉+ |c〉) , |m〉 = 1√
3
(|a〉+ |b〉 − |c〉)
|a+〉 =
1√
2
(|a〉+ |c〉) , |a−〉 = 1√2 (|a〉 − |c〉)
|b+〉 =
1√
2
(|b〉+ |c〉) , |b−〉 = 1√2 (|b〉 − |c〉)
where |a〉 , |b〉 , |c〉 form an orthonormal basis, with the
three measurements:
M1 : |a+〉 〈a+ | , |a−〉 〈a− | , |b〉 〈b |
M2 : |b+〉 〈b+ | , |b−〉 〈b− | , |a〉 〈a |
M3 : |a〉 〈a | , |b〉 〈b | , |c〉 〈c |
(These are the states and measurements used in
the Clifton-Stairs proof of quantum contextuality[20,
21]. For further connections to quantum contextuality,
see[22].)
The results are shown in Table I. From M1 it can be
seen that
∀λ ∈ Λa, ξM1(b|λ) = 0
∀λ ∈ Λp, ξM1(a−|λ) = 0
∀λ ∈ Λm, ξM1(a+|λ) = 0
(9)
For any given λ, it must be that ξM1(b|λ) + ξM1(a−|λ) +
ξM1(a+|λ) = 1, so this means:
Λa ∩ Λp ∩ Λm = ∅ (10)
Similarly
Λc ∩ Λp ∩ Λm = ∅ (11)
M2 adds
Λb ∩ Λp ∩ Λm = ∅ (12)
leading to
(Λa ∪ Λb ∪ Λc) ∩ Λp ∩ Λm = ∅ (13)
3(a)
M1
|b〉 〈b | |a+〉 〈a+ | |a−〉 〈a− |
|a〉 0 1
2
1
2
|b〉 1 0 0
|c〉 0 1
2
1
2
|p〉 1
3
2
3
0
|m〉 1
3
0 2
3
(b)
M2
|a〉 〈a | |b+〉 〈b+ | |b−〉 〈b− |
|a〉 1 0 0
|b〉 0 1
2
1
2
|c〉 0 1
2
1
2
|p〉 1
3
2
3
0
|m〉 1
3
0 2
3
(c)
M3
|a〉 〈a | |b〉 〈b | |c〉 〈c |
|a〉 1 0 0
|b〉 0 1 0
|c〉 0 0 1
|p〉 1
3
1
3
1
3
|m〉 1
3
1
3
1
3
TABLE I: Measurement outcomes
If there is any overlap in Λp∩Λm then it must lie outside
Λa ∪ Λb ∪ Λc.
Now M3 gives ∫
Λa
µp(λ)dλ =
Ω [a, p]
3
(14)
and similarly for |b〉 and |c〉. As Λb ∩ Λa = ∅ etc.∫
(Λa∪Λb∪Λc)
µp(λ)dλ =
(Ω [a, p] + Ω [b, p] + Ω [c, p])
3
(15)
It follows that:∫
Λm
µp(λ)dλ ≤ 1−
(Ω [a, p] + Ω [b, p] + Ω [c, p])
3
(16)
but ∫
Λm
µp(λ)dλ =
Ω [m, p]
9
(17)
giving
Ω [m, p]
9
≤ 1−
(Ω [a, p] + Ω [b, p] + Ω [c, p])
3
(18)
If the ontic model has maximal epistemic overlaps with
the |a〉 , |b〉 , |c〉 states, then Ω [a, p] = Ω [b, p] = Ω [c, p] =
1, but this requires Ω [m, p] = 0 while |〈m |p〉|2 = 19 .
This proves that a maximally Ψ-epistemic theory is not
possible.
Reducing the degree of epistemicness in the |a〉 , |b〉 , |c〉
basis will allow some epistemic overlap between |p〉 and
|m〉. For example, keeping Ω [a, p] = Ω [b, p] = 1 it is
possible to reach Ω [m, p] = 1 with Ω [c, p] = 23 . More
symmetrically, Ω [m, p] = 1 is possible with Ω [a, p] =
Ω [b, p] = Ω [c, p] = 89 .
A basis independent measure of how epistemic a theory
can be and still reproduce quantum statistics is given by
letting Ω [φ, ψ] = Ω be a constant for all non-orthogonal
states. This gives:
Ω ≤
9
10
(19)
Higher dimensional Hilbert spaces.- The above results
can be generalised to Hilbert spaces of dimension d > 3.
In the limit of large d, Ω ≤ 12 .
Take the basis states
|a1〉 , |a2〉 , . . . |ad〉
the superpositions
|ai+〉 =
1√
2
(|ai〉+ |ad〉)
|ai−〉 = 1√2 (|ai〉 − |ad〉)
|pd〉 =
1√
d
∑
i=1,d |ai〉
|md〉 =
1√
d
(∑
i=1,d−1 |ai〉
)
− 1√
d
|ad〉
and the measurements
Mi : |a1〉 〈a1 | , . . . , |ai−1〉 〈ai−1 | ,
|ai+1〉 〈ai+1 | , . . . , |ad−1〉 〈ad−1 | ,
|ai+〉 〈ai+ | , |ai−〉 〈ai− |
Md : |a1〉 〈a1 | , . . . , |ad〉 〈ad |
Each measurement Mi now shows:
Λai ∩ Λpd ∩ Λmd = ∅
Λad ∩ Λpd ∩ Λmd = ∅
(20)
leading to
(∪iΛai) ∩ Λpd ∩ Λmd = ∅ (21)
From the Md measurement:∫
(∪iΛai)
µpd(λ)dλ =
∑
i
Ω [ai, pd] |〈ai |pd〉|
2
=
1
d
∑
i
Ω [ai, pd]
(22)
so ∫
Λmd
µpd(λ)dλ ≤ 1−
1
d
∑
i
Ω [ai, pd] (23)
giving
Ω [md, pd]
(
1−
2
d
)2
≤ 1−
1
d
∑
i
Ω [ai, pd] (24)
4Once again, Ω [ai, pd] = 1 would require Ω [md, pd] = 0,
even though |〈md |pd〉|
2
=
(
1− 2
d
)2
→ 1. For a theory to
be maximally Ψ-epistemic in a specific basis, then as d→
∞ it must become maximally Ψ-ontic between at least
some states arbitrarily close to each other. To obtain
a full overlap Ω [md, pd] = 1 by symmetrically reducing
the overlap with the |ai〉 basis would require Ω [ai, pd] =
4
d2
(d− 1)→ 0.
The basis independent measure of how epistemic this
allows the theory overall sets Ω [φ, ψ] = Ω(d) as before
giving
Ω(d) ≤
d2
2d2 − 4d+ 4
(25)
In the limit d gets large, Ω(d) ≤ 12 .
Experimental Noise.- The calculations depend upon
obtaining zero probability of obtaining a set of outcomes
for particular measurements. In any real experiment,
there will be some noise, giving a value ǫ > 0. In such
cases the results calculated above become unstable.
Following [5], the measure of overlap in the ontic state
distribution which can be compared to experimental data
in the presence of noise is the quantum trace norm dis-
tance, rather than the quantum state overlap:
δQ(ρ, σ) =
1
2
Tr |ρ− σ|2 (26)
This has an operational interpretation: if one of two
quantum states, ρ or σ is prepared with equal proba-
bility, then using an optimal quantum measurement, the
probability of correctly identifying which is given by
PQ =
1
2
(1 + δQ(ρ, σ)) (27)
This should be compared to the classical trace norm dis-
tance
δC(p, q) =
1
2
∫
|p(x)− q(x)|2 dx (28)
which also has an operational interpretation: if a random
variable x is prepared by one of two methods, producing
classical distributions p(x) and q(x) respectively, the op-
timal probability of guessing which method was used is
given by
PC =
1
2
(1 + δC(p, q)) (29)
In any ontological model for quantum theory, the mea-
suring device is presented with an ontic state λ, prepared
with the probability distribution µφ(λ) or µψ(λ). As this
is the most information the optimal measuring device
has available, the probability of guessing which quantum
state φ or ψ was prepared, based only on the outputs of
the measuring device, cannot be greater than the prob-
ability of guessing based upon the ontic state itself, so
PQ ≤ PC .
The quantum trace distance for pure states is
δQ(φ, ψ) =
√
1− |〈φ |ψ〉|2 (30)
while the classical trace norm distance can be expressed
as
δC(φ, ψ) = 1−
∫
min[µφ(λ), µφ(λ)]dλ (31)
leading to
∫
min[µφ(λ), µφ(λ)]dλ ≤ 1−
√
1− |〈φ |ψ〉|2 (32)
In a maximally Ψ-ontic theory, the left hand side is zero,
while in a maximally Ψ-epistemic theory the equality
should be reached. A routine but lengthy calculation
shows that for the experimental arrangements considered
here, the inequality is strict between some pairs of states
in all Hilbert spaces of dimension d > 14.
∫
min[µφ(λ), µφ(λ)]dλ
1−
√
1− |〈φ |ψ〉|2
< 1 (33)
A discussion of this measure, as well as an experimental
arrangement better suited to comparing the trace norm
distances which extends the result to all Hilbert spaces
of dimension d > 2 will be discussed in the forthcoming
[23].
Conclusions.- There exist constructive examples of Ψ-
epistemic models, which can reproduce all the statistics
of quantum theory (such as the LJBR model[11] and the
ABCL model[10]). It is therefore not the intention of this
article to attempt to construct no-go theorems which aim
to show that Ψ-epistemic theories are impossible sim-
pliciter. Existing no-go theorems have effectively sought
to prove Ω [φ, ψ] = 0, but to do so must assume addi-
tional properties, such as forms of locality[6], factoris-
ability of product states[5] or non-invasiveness[8]. This
should not downplay the significance of these theorems:
any attempt to construct Ψ-epistemic theories must nec-
essarily reject these properties, in much the same way
that Bell’s theorem[24] requires realist interpretations of
quantum theory to reject local causality. They help to
map out the space of possible theories which can account
for quantum phenomena.
The no-go theorem presented here contributes to this
task. It does not make additional assumptions so applies
even to theories that reject all of these additional as-
sumptions, such as the LJBR and ABCL models. These
models demonstrate that Ω [φ, ψ] > 0 is indeed possible.
This no-go theorem shows that Ω [φ, ψ] < 1, and this re-
sult follows directly from the definition of a Ψ-epistemic
model, even if all other assumptions are dropped.
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